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The centennial of Albert Camus’s birth, duly marked by academic conferences in history and 
literature departments, has had little resonance in European Union (“EU”) legal scholarship. Yet 
the political engagement of the French-Algerian Nobel Laureate is a natural entry point into the 
EU’s laws and policies vis-à-vis the global South, and Algeria is today a particularly salient 
example of the EU’s relations with North Africa.[1] The Parisian tragedies of January 2015 have 
brought into the spotlight all that can go wrong in post-colonial societies and called into question 
the efficacy of a vast array of French, European, and more broadly “Western” choices in the 
Mediterranean region. In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo massacre, the legal community has 
naturally focused on the scope of free speech and on the resilience of secular democracies, but 
fresh and deeper analyses are needed in many other dimensions, ranging from migration 
management to strategies for the development of Europe’s southern neighbors. 
Among the subjects of such analyses—we argue—should be the effects of the EU’s trade 
policies with regard to North Africa. Migration flows are determined by poverty and unrest in 
countries of origin, and because trade is often touted as a tool for bettering the economic and 
political stability of all trading partners,[2] it is important to empirically verify the impact of 
trade agreements on the overall wellbeing of Europe’s partners. Camus himself identified free 
trade as an instrument of peace and prosperity within Europe and believed that Algeria would 
thrive in the context of a pan-European market.[3] After his death, the process of market 
integration did indeed take place in the Old continent, and a parallel process of trade 
liberalization has since occurred across the Mediterranean, but the impact of such processes on 
Algeria continues to be mixed news. It is on such news that we shall now focus. 
Mercantile deals may strike readers as an elliptic target in this context. Since the 1960s, the 
emancipation of formerly colonial economies has been conceived as too delicate an enterprise to 
be left to the simple logic of free trade, and has traditionally been framed as a matter of 
“development cooperation”—a rapidly evolving blend of tariff preferences, financial assistance, 
and now rule-of-law and democracy-building programs in favor of struggling nations.[4] Yet the 
removal of residual barriers to trade in goods and services continues to be a core aspect of EU 
activity. In many circles, including the European Commission’s Directorate General for Trade 
(“DG Trade”), trade liberalization across the Mediterranean has featured regularly as a goal since 
the 1990s and is often an established reality.[5] The association agreements linking the EU with 
North African states all aim at reciprocal market opening as a matter of principle. In an era of 
generally low trade barriers, such arrangements may seem unremarkable, but they produce 
dramatic distributive consequences and therefore need unwavering attention. 
Recent empirical studies concerning EU association agreements with eastern neighboring 
countries have pointed out that trade liberalization, even when it generates wealth in the 
aggregate, may worsen the plague of spatial disparity and deepen existing cleavages in already 
dysfunctional societies.[6]  Small changes in the patterns of commerce can suppress entire 
sectors of the economy—especially sectors that could have fostered rural development or 
economic diversification. And because rural development and diversification are generally 
deemed essential to healing the social fabric of Europe’s neighbors, it is now particularly 
important to gauge the real effects of the EU’s commercial policy in North Africa and the Middle 
East.[7] The point of this Article is to invite particularized inquiries into the consequences of 
trade between the EU and each of its partners, using not only econometric tools but also textured 
accounts of historical legacies. 
Exemplifying this line of inquiry with the case of Algeria seems appropriate not just because of 
the current salience of French-Algerian relations, but also because of this country’s particular 
enmeshment with the history of the EU’s commercial policies.[8] Algeria proclaimed its 
independence from France in 1962, which means that for five years the Algerian territory was a 
part of the European Economic Community (“EEC”) through France and that Algerian 
decolonization was synchronous with the creation of a customs union in the heart of Europe.[9] 
Close studies of Algeria in those years indicate that massive trade diversions resulted from the 
very birth of the Common Market.[10] It is also the case that current trade policies, while 
incorporated in broader cooperation instruments, are not adequately redressing the effects of 
such lopsided arrangements. 
This Article, linking the 1960s death of the Algerian wine industry to the country’s ongoing 
struggle to diversify its markets, point at patterns of trade that have failed to assuage crucial 
problems in Algeria’s economy. In the process of putting together the puzzle of North-South 
relations, this is a piece we should not lose sight of. 
1.     Algeria’s Economy Today: An Overview 
The risks and sacrifices that so many Algerian migrants face in Europe give us a sense of the 
misery they leave behind when they embark on their journey of hope. High rates of 
unemployment, combined with lack of faith in the ruling class, generate massive emigration 
fluxes.[11] The nature of misery in contemporary Algeria is, however, not obvious. There is a 
significant discrepancy between the image of a destitute land, which migrants eagerly flee, and 
the relatively solid portrait of Algeria that emerges from aggregate data. Algeria is a “middle-
income” country that has managed to refrain from external borrowing since 2005. High-energy 
prices in the early 2000s generated extra revenue, which allowed the Algerian government to 
repay its foreign debt and increase its geopolitical importance. According to a recent economic 
profile, 
Algeria has the 10th-largest reserves of natural gas in the world and is the sixth-largest gas 
exporter. It ranks 16th in oil reserves. Strong revenues from hydrocarbon exports have brought 
Algeria relative macroeconomic stability, with foreign currency reserves approaching $200 
billion and a large budget stabilization fund available for tapping. In addition, Algeria’s external 
debt is extremely low at about 2% of GDP.[12] 
Moreover, the country was notably not shaken by the Arab Spring and has been relatively stable 
for the past decade.[13] Terrorist attacks, mostly launched from neighboring countries’ Islamic 
extremists, periodically wreak havoc and slow down the pace of foreign investment, but remain 
relatively self-contained and do not disrupt the country’s productive life.[14] 
Wealth and relative stability, however, have not borne sufficient fruit in many pockets of 
Algerian society. The point is that the cash flow generated by hydrocarbons comes with two 
significant drawbacks.  First, it is concentrated in the hands of the country’s elite or siphoned off 
to foreign investors, with no immediate benefits for the Algerian poor.[15] Second, it is 
excessively dependent on world price fluctuation and is therefore subject to sudden contractions. 
The country’s economy continues to be plagued by lack of diversification (with hydrocarbons 
accounting for 95% of Algerian export earnings)[16] and spatial disparity, i.e. abysmal poverty 
in rural areas and largely disappointing performance of privately owned business. Virtually all 
sectors of Algeria’s economy, with the exception of oil and gas, still struggle. 
From the perspective of developed countries, the cause of such problems lies in the Algerian 
government’s reluctance to liberalize. Algeria’s patterns of state intervention in the economy, 
expansive fiscal policy, and relatively profligate public spending stand in stark contrast with 
current recipes for progress.[17] In 2013, the World Bank’s Doing Business report ranked 
Algeria 152 out of 185 economies, indicating that the Algerian regulatory environment is not 
hospitable to business, and in particular to small and medium enterprises.[18] 
It is indeed common knowledge that the Algerian government keeps a tight grip on economic 
activity. President Boumedienne’s large nationalization project in 1971 has since given way to a 
more liberal attitude towards private entrepreneurship. Still, government policies remain wary of 
foreign investment. For example, the government passed the Hydrocarbons Law of 2005, which 
was meant to terminate the state’s monopoly over all hydrocarbon-related activities, from 
exploration to transportation. Indeed, the Hydrocarbons Law paved the way for new and 
transparent bidding processes for international investors. An executive order in 2006, however, 
guaranteed a 51% government share in all ventures and introduced additional tax burdens for 
foreign investors.[19] 
This concentration of power in government hands has also been denounced as a deplorable 
obstacle to Algeria’s own private entrepreneurship. The African Development Bank, for 
instance, has noted the Algerian government’s insistence on pouring resources into state-owned 
industries.[20] This policy is radically at odds with Europe’s liberalization mantra, both within 
the energy sector and across the board of economic activities.[21] To be sure, one finds 
occasional acknowledgements that Algeria’s timely reduction of foreign debt sheltered the 
country from the global financial turmoil of 2008.[22] What is more common, however, is a 
general condemnation of Algeria’s economic policies, both towards Foreign Direct Investment 
(“FDI”) and with regards to domestic enterprises.[23]   
Against this background, we ask, has the EU’s trade and cooperation agenda contributed to the 
betterment of the country—to diversifying its economy, to restructuring its productive sectors, or 
to raising the standards of its rural life? The answer to this question is mixed. As observed, it is 
common, in Europe and elsewhere, to blame Algeria for its own troubles. Yet, there is room for 
considering whether EU policies may have, over time, also tied Algeria to the status quo. 
2.     Cooperation 
Ameliorating the economic conditions of the Maghreb, and of Algeria in particular, is a goal dear 
to the EU polity for reasons that range from energy security to humanitarian concerns. The 
Algerian government, in particular, is a desirable bulwark against terrorism and irregular 
migration from the heart of Africa. Europe is thus invested in shoring up its strength and 
enabling its “prosperity and stability.” Cooperation with North African countries—already 
embedded in a series of country-specific agreements such as the EEC-Algeria Cooperation 
Agreement of 1976 (“1976 Cooperation Agreement”)[24]—was re-launched as a general policy 
with the Barcelona Declaration in 1995,[25] and then deepened and revived in 2008 within the 
framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (“ENP”). [26] 
Over the years, in conjunction with new theorizations in the field of law and development, the 
meaning of cooperation has evolved. In the 1976 Cooperation Agreement, cooperation meant 
financial assistance from the EEC budget in limited fields of production, the training of 
executives, and the construction of new infrastructure. In the 2002 Association Agreement that 
has since replaced the 1976 deal, cooperation reaches deep into civil society, education, and rule-
of-law initiatives.[27] Most recently, the EU has adopted a new tool for cooperation, the 
European Neighborhood Instrument (“ENI”), which renews conditional promises of assistance to 
its neighbors.[28] The promotion of “deep and sustainable democracy”—a core item in the ENP 
agenda—includes such objectives as fair elections, freedom of expression, judicial 
independence, fighting against corruption, and migration management. It encompasses concerted 
efforts to underpin the Algerian economy and solidify the rule of law.[29]  In sum, in line with 
the post-Washington Consensus, today’s cooperation aims to strengthen the institutional capacity 
of Europe’s neighbors—a capacity that is deemed essential to enable free trade and to reap its 
fruits.[30] 
Trade and cooperation are supposed to be two sides of the same coin and to be perfectly suited to 
reinforce one another. In principle, cooperation strengthens the institutions upon which a market 
economy depends and provides incentives for liberalization. In turn, the loosening of the state’s 
grip on business enables new private initiatives; the economy then diversifies and the promised 
benefits of comparative advantage, thanks to the abatement of trade barriers, can then be fully 
realized. In the spirit of cooperation, the EU promises to lend know-how, institutional expertise 
and, of course, money.[31] Help, however, comes with strings and is conditioned upon the 
partner state’s willingness to engage in meaningful structural reforms: reducing the scope of 
monopolies, protecting intellectual property, cutting red tape, and letting the private sector—
whether local or foreign—take charge of yet untapped resources.[32] 
Within the framework of cooperation, difficulties have been remarkable. According to the 
Association Agreement, the full-range implementation and funding of cooperation initiatives 
requires an Action Plan, which is supposed to describe in detail Algeria’s commitments to 
reform and the EU’s necessary supporting measures. However, no Action Plan has seen the light 
of day.[33] Conditionality has worked well with Algeria’s more palatable and reform-oriented 
neighbors—most notably Morocco—but not so with Algeria itself.[34] Due to its statist 
tendencies, the Algerian government comes across as the “most awkward” partner[35] of the EU 
amongst North African states. Most recently, the Commission has sketched for the Council a 
proposed Framework Agreement that would allow Algeria to participate in EU programs and 
receive significant assistance,[36] but Algeria seems to be politically “frozen.”[37] Thus, the 
distribution of EU aid in the ENP context sees Algeria at the bottom of the list of recipients.[38] 
The following critique, directed to the ENP overall, captures particularly well the cooperation 
impasse between the EU and Algeria: 
[R]ather than offering a clear carrot from the outset, under the ENP the EU requires countries to 
undertake a variety of reforms, and only once reforms have been implemented will the EU 
consider offering the possibility of some form of deeper relations.[39] 
The carrot and stick game known as conditionality seems to have turned into a chicken and egg 
problem: Algeria and the EU cannot agree on whether structural reform depends on aid or vice 
versa. The result is gridlock: the EU places ever more emphasis on conditionality (“more for 
more”) and Algeria remains unyielding. 
3.     Reluctance revisited 
Overall, the EU seems poised to pressure Algeria into opening its markets to competition. For 
Algeria, however, the fluctuation of prices and the decreased predictability that come from 
market liberalization are harbingers of serious challenges. A loss of market share is a terrifying 
prospect for a country whose eggs are in one basket, and Algeria’s economy remains entirely 
dependent on its hydrocarbon reserves. The reasons for this predicament are in many ways 
endogenous, but external causes must be noted as well.[40] The EU-Algeria 2013 Memorandum 
of Understanding (“Memorandum”) on strategic energy partnership,[41] for instance, further 
consolidates the narrow range of Algeria’s productive activities (oil and gas). The Memorandum 
does mention the possibility of cooperation in renewable energy sectors, but a recent attempt to 
boost solar energy production in Algeria has not proven viable as a result of shrinking budgets in 
EU member states, and it is by no means clear that this Memorandum could resurrect the solar 
energy project.[42] Against this background, Algeria’s mistrust does not seem irrational. 
There are also other explanations for Algeria’s seemingly obstinate and self-defeating posture in 
the face of EU offers. A closer look at the details of the agreements that have been negotiated 
reveals another side of the EU-Algeria relations—namely, trade in goods—which receives less 
attention than cooperation, and yet is particularly revealing of endemic and historically charged 
imbalances of power. In the EU’s proffered trade deals, there is a growing insistence on parity of 
trade terms. The website of the DG Trade informs the public that as of 2014 Algeria no longer 
benefits from the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (“GSP”), because its Free Trade 
Agreement (“FTA”) with the EU is finally coming to fruition.[43]  For countries like Algeria, 
whose citizens still hold vivid memories of colonial times, the ongoing transition from 
differential regimes to fully reciprocal FTAs could represent modernity and emancipation. There 
is much dignity in such development, and the tone of the DG Trade’s announcement is 
accordingly upbeat.[44] In terms of effectiveness, however, EU trade policies vis-à-vis Algeria 
have a less than stellar record. These policies are worth exploring in some detail to better 
understand why the relationship between EU and Algeria retains features of structural imbalance 
half a century after the proclamation of Algeria’s independence. 
4.     Camus and Trade 
Over the course of his life, Albert Camus developed and nurtured two parallel federalist projects: 
one for Algeria, which he imagined as a pluralist society in which French nationals would 
continue to enjoy political representation alongside Arabs, Berbers, and ethnic minorities;[45] 
and the other one for Europe, wherein—in synch with communist intellectuals[46]—Camus 
auspicated the peaceful rapprochement of France and Germany and a complete demise of 
nationalism, to be realized by means of free markets and shared political institutions.[47]  
Camus’s first project foundered. The political deal he had envisaged for Algeria had despicable 
colonial features—most notably the over-representation of French interests in Algerian 
democracy—and grew less and less realistic over time.[48] As evidenced by his socio-political 
commentaries, by the 1950s Camus himself had become painfully disillusioned with his own 
recipe for Algerian government.[49] By contrast, the project of a peaceful, united Europe 
succeeded well beyond the limits of Camus’s imagination. In March 1957, the French foreign 
Minister Christian Pineau—himself a communist and a protagonist of French Resistance—co-
signed the Treaty of Rome, turning at least one of Camus’s federalist dreams into reality. As a 
result of French membership, the Algerian nation became part of the EEC. The 1957 Treaty of 
Rome specified that Algeria, while not a member state in itself, would gain both rights and 
obligations related to the free movement of all Community goods, and would also partake in the 
Community regime for agriculture.[50] Had he lived longer, Camus would have probably asked 
what a united Europe could do to rescue Algeria from economic and political dysfunction. 
Would the Community’s free trade recipe—the principled abolition of all frontières 
douanières—provide an answer to this unspoken question? 
The Treaty mandated the abolition of all tariffs on imports and exports within the Community, 
but it granted the Member States twelve years to accomplish this goal. Algeria became 
independent in 1962, thereby exiting the Community before the demise of all internal customs 
duties. Algerian exports, therefore, never came to be fully liberalized onto the European market. 
Quite to the contrary, the creation of a Common Market in continental Europe had the effect of 
erecting new obstacles to Algerian products. Wine illustrates this point effectively. 
5.     Wine and the Origin of EEC-Algeria Trade 
The bloodiest time in French-Algerian history—the Algerian war of independence—coincided 
with Algeria’s entry into the EEC, not as a member state but as an integral part of France.[51] 
European inclusion was short-lived: as a result of the Evian Accords of 1962, Algeria was 
excised from the Community, and many Algerian-born persons, having enjoyed French 
nationality, returned to third-country national status.[52] The same happened to goods. Algerian 
wine, for instance, initially treated as French for customs purposes, suddenly became a third-
country product. This story illustrates the possibly negative externalities of EU market 
integration and casts EU policies towards Algeria in a less than glowing light. 
The wine industry had been born on Algerian soil in the 1870s, following an epidemic of 
phylloxera in France. Vine farmers had relocated en masse in Algeria, carrying with them 
sophisticated winemaking technologies—most importantly refrigeration systems—and taking 
advantage of native farmers as cheap labor. Imports from Algeria ensured adequate wine supply 
in France in times of scarcity, but even when production resumed abundant on French soil, the 
Pieds Noirs kept a steady market share in France. [53] By the 1950s, Algeria had become the 
largest exporter of wine in the world.[54] For religious and political reasons, there was no 
consumption of wine amongst Algerians, and France was its only market.[55] 
The nationalization of Algerian agriculture, declared immediately after independence, led wine 
producers of French nationality to return home, leaving behind a thriving industry. Algeria relied 
for a while on a 1964 French commitment to purchase its wine—part of a larger cooperation 
effort in the aftermath of independence—but France, upon Italy’s insistence, did not honor that 
deal.[56] The Algerian government also sought to maintain, at least de facto, a privileged trade 
regime with the Community,[57] and refused to sign a 1969 cooperation agreement that would 
hurt its ability to export agricultural products to the EEC.[58] But things were inexorably 
changing. 
As soon as France ceased to erect protectionist barriers against other European wines, imports 
from Algeria lost their competitive edge.[59]  An EEC Regulation designed to launch a Common 
Wine Policy also determined that bottles produced on the Continent could not contain wine of 
non-EEC origin.[60] The onset of European integration resulted in the complete demise of a 
once profitable stream of commerce. 
This episode, by now well documented, is a dramatic illustration of the trade diverting effects of 
market integration in the EU. It is often the case that the enablement of free trade within a given 
region of the world upsets preexisting patterns of commerce in third countries. But Algeria was 
no third country when European integration began, and had relied on trade continuity after 
political independence. As time went on, it became increasingly clear that Algeria could no 
longer count on privileged commercial ties to Paris due to the Métropole’s new allegiances and 
obligations towards the Community’s member states. In 1978, when the Cooperation Agreement 
entered into force, Algeria’s economy suffered additional setbacks. With regard to goods, the 
Cooperation Agreement offered Algeria free access to the EEC market for most of its non-
agricultural products, as well as some tariff concessions for its agricultural exports. At the same 
time, textiles and refined petroleum products from Algeria stopped benefiting from zero rate 
tariffs. Seasonal restrictions were also imposed upon the import of agricultural products, with 
“disastrous” consequences for Algerian exports.[61] The 1980s’ accession of Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal dealt an additional blow to Algeria’s chance of selling its agricultural goods 
competitively to EEC customers.[62] 
6.     Trade in Goods Today 
The graduation of Algeria from GSP status to free trade partner, hopefully soon to join the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”),[63] is noted in the DG Trade website as a definite step in the right 
direction.[64] 
Below the surface of such glib announcements lies an unsurprisingly complex reality. The free 
trade deal is a section of the Association Agreement, which entered into force in 2005 and laid 
the ground for the effacement of tariffs in EU-Algeria commerce.[65] Following the blueprint of 
the EU’s GSP, the Agreement provided for immediate non-reciprocal concessions: as soon as the 
Agreement became effective, the EU dropped down to zero the tariffs on most Algerian 
imports;[66] Algeria, by contrast, was allowed to keep in place temporary custom duties to 
protect national industries, and was given twelve years to phase them out. 
This lopsided arrangement, while favorable to Algeria, was unlikely to stimulate imports for 
several reasons. First, the EU grants free-trade privileges to an increasingly large number of 
countries, and duty-free access to its market is now the baseline for most competitors—certainly 
not a coveted prize for the few. Second, some exporting countries have negotiated better terms 
(i.e., duty-free access for a broader range of products) than Algeria could ever receive, because 
Algeria does not qualify as a “vulnerable” economy by EU standards.[67] Third, and most 
importantly, duty-free access only benefits those industries whose goods would be competitive in 
terms of both quality and price in the absence of trade barriers. Many of Algeria’s products, 
however, are less than competitive, and are not likely to win the hearts and purses of EU 
consumers even if unencumbered by tariffs. As a result, the asymmetric trade concessions 
graciously granted by the EU have been less helpful than anticipated. 
The detailed data on EU-Algeria trade recently released by the DG Trade corroborate this 
sobering assessment.[68] Statistical figures track the trend of imports and exports from 2008 to 
2012—well after the entry into force of the Association Agreement. Numbers and charts 
illustrate very clearly that the EU market is notably not flooded with any of the goods that either 
farmers or small and medium enterprises in Algeria are likely to produce. Empirical studies show 
that Algerian exports to the EU in all non-hydrocarbon sectors have not experienced any 
significant trade creation.[69] Imports into the EU from Algeria have grown significantly in the 
aggregate, but this growth is only due to a spike in imports of “mineral products.”[70] Trade in 
minerals, given the structure and ownership of Algerian natural resources, brings revenue either 
to the government or—since the partial liberalization of the sector[71]—to foreign investment, 
but not to middle-scale entrepreneurship. With the exception of animal hides and leather, Algeria 
is a net importer of all manufactured items, agricultural products, and textiles. Algerian textiles, 
in particular, are no longer to be found in the list of exports to the EU.[72] Textiles are an 
important part of Algeria’s traditional economy,[73] and also a staple of small and medium 
enterprises, but the textile sector finds no reward or boost in the EU market.[74] 
In parallel, the reduction of Algerian custom duties upon European goods has resulted in a 
significant boost to EU exports, which reduce consumption of local goods, and in a loss of 
custom revenues for the state.[75] For these reasons, in 2012 the Algerian government was given 
a longer time to implement the total phase-out, now postponed until 2020.[76] In sum, the duty-
free access to the EU market has not managed to alter the export patterns of Algeria. The EU’s 
trade policy is not conducive to Algeria’s economic diversification and does not assuage the 
country’s dependence on energy exports. 
Conclusion 
The sketch drawn in this Article suggests that the ideally virtuous circle of trade and cooperation 
has not necessarily yielded the desired results in EU-Algeria relations.  History is replete with 
examples in which the opening of markets has not worked towards diversification, but rather 
against it.  Wine in the 1960s, textiles in the 1980s, and most recently clean energy initiatives 
have provided illustrations of a recurrent pattern—one in which markets fail to prompt 
diversification and rather ossify entrenched economic structures. Cooperation measures, rather 
than synergic complements to trade, become necessary to compensate for the market’s negative 
impact. Predictably, however, the resilient rhetoric of neoliberalism gets in the way of detailed 
analyses and perpetuates the assumption that free trade works regularly towards social peace and 
widespread prosperity.[77] 
There is insufficient dialogue between post-colonial studies and current analyses of trade flows. 
History escapes, by definition, the scrutiny of contemporary empirical inquiries. It is therefore 
difficult to connect new dots to old ones, and to see the line that runs, unchanged, through 
today’s energy markets and through the wine commerce of the 1960s. Yet, grappling with 
contemporary socio-political nightmares will require exactly this type of work. 
 
 
 
† Professor of Law, Boston University. 
‡ J.D., Harvard Law School. 
* Thanks to Bill Davies, Thomas Dodman, Michelle Egan, Adam Gopnik, Duncan Kennedy, 
Fernanda Nicola, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, and Vlad Perju. Further helpful suggestions came from 
participants to the conferences Albert Camus and Algeria (November 25, 2013, Boston College 
Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy) and EU Law Stories: Comparative 
and Contextual Histories of European Jurisprudence (March 13, 2014, American University 
Washington College of Law). Thanks also to Kaitlin Raymond for helpful research assistance. 
Errors remain our own. Adapted portions of this essay will appear as Part III in a book chapter: 
Melki In Context: Algeria and European Legal Integration, in EU LAW STORIES (Bill Davies and 
Fernanda Nicola eds., forthcoming 2015). 
[1] The Parisian tragedies of January 2015 have brought French-Algerian relations into the 
spotlight. The Charlie Hebdo massacre was the work of two brothers of Algerian origin, and the 
perpetrator of the supermarket siege in eastern Paris had a history of affiliation with Algerian 
terrorism. See Rukmini Callimachi & Andrew Higgins, Video Shows a Paris Gunman Declaring 
His Loyalty to the Islamic State, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2015. 
[2] See, critically, VISHAAL KISHORE, RICARDO’S GAUNTLET: ECONOMIC FICTION AND THE 
FLAWED CASE FOR FREE TRADE (2014). 
[3] See infra, Section 4. 
[4] PIET EECKHOUT, EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS 451 (2d ed. 2011); Lorand Bartels, The Trade 
and Development Policy of the European Union, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 715 (2007). 
[5] See Bartels, supra note 4 (noting that the EU was pressured by the WTO to embrace 
reciprocity and abandon preferential treatment based on historical ties with particular countries). 
[6] Vassilis Monastiriotis, Dimitris Kallioras & George Petrakos, The Regional Impact of EU 
Association Agreements: Lessons for the ENP from the CEE Experience 20 (LEQS Discussion 
Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 80/2014, 2014). 
[7] A similar plea for close investigation, given the worrisome distributive impact of association 
agreements in the EU neighborhood, is voiced by Monastiriotis. Id. 
[8] See Muriam Haleh Davis, Restaging Mise en Valeur: “Postwar Imperialism” and the Plan 
de Constantine, 44 REV. MID. E. STUD. 176 (2010). 
[9] Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Southern Barbarians? A Post-colonial Critique of EUniversalism, in 
ECHOES OF EMPIRE: MEMORY, IDENTITY AND COLONIAL LEGACIES 247 (Kalypso Nicolaïdis, 
Berny Sèbe & Gabrielle Maas eds., 2014). 
[10] See Giulia Meloni & Johan Swinnen, The Rise and Fall of the World’s Largest Wine 
Exporter (and its Institutional Legacy) (Am. Ass’n of Wine Economists, Working Paper No. 
134, 2013). 
[11] See David N. Margolis, Egidio Luis Miotti, El Mouhoub Mouhoud & Joel Oudinet, To Have 
and Have Not: Migration, Remittances, Poverty and Inequality in Algeria (IZA Discussion Paper 
No. 7747, 2013); Vivienne Walt, With Limited Freedoms, Many Algerians Vote with Their Feet, 
TIME, Feb. 18, 2013. 
[12] Algeria Economy Profile 2013, INDEX MUNDI (Aug. 23, 2014), 
http://www.indexmundi.com/algeria/economy_profile.html. 
[13] On the Algerian violence of the 1990s, see LUIS MARTINEZ & JOHN ENTELIS, THE ALGERIAN 
CIVIL WAR (2000); see also Eleanor Beardsley, Algeria’s Black Decade Still Weighs Heavily, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.wbur.org/npr/135376589/algerias-black-decade-
still-weighs-heavily. 
[14] Algeria’s Oil and Gas: Not so Jolly, ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21571480-recent-events-and-wariness-
foreign-investors-dent-oil-and-gas-economy-not. 
[15] See Lama Abu-Odeh, On Law and the Transition to Market: The Case of Egypt, 23 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 351 (2009) (discussing the interplay of market dynamics and rentier state politics 
in oil-rich economies). 
[16] INDEX MUNDI, supra note 12. 
[17] See Algeria Overview, WORLD BANK (Mar. 12, 2014), 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/algeria/overview. 
[18] WORLD BANK GRP., DOING BUSINESS 2015, GOING BEYOND EFFICIENCY, ECONOMY 
PROFILE: ALGERIA (2015). 
[19] See Omar T. Mohammedi, International Trade and Investment in Algeria: An Overview, 18 
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 375, 386 (2010) (quoting Jean-Michel Meyer, Investissement: l’Algérie 
impose sa loi, JEUNE AFRIQUE, July 28, 2009). 
[20] AFRICAN DEV. BANK GRP., PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA: DIALOGUE NOTE 
2011-2012 2.4.9 (2011). 
[21] Press Release, Christine Lagarde, Managing Director, IMF, Visit to Algeria (Mar. 13, 2013) 
(pleading for “a new awakening of the private sector” and “[s]tructural reforms to enhance the 
business climate”). 
[22] See, e.g., AFRICAN DEV. BANK GRP., supra note 20. 
[23] See, e.g., Telecoms in Algeria: A Lost Generation, ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 2013. 
[24] Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Algeria, E.E.C.-Alg., Apr. 22, 1976, 1978 O.J. (L 263) 2 [hereinafter 
Cooperation Agreement]. 
[25] MARKUS HAHN, THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP: THE BARCELONA PROCESS 
SINCE 1995 (2009). 
[26] The ENP was established in 2004 with the goal of spreading prosperity and stability in the 
EU’s post-enlargement neighborhood. It was then differentiated into the Union for the 
Mediterranean (which in 2008 revived the Barcelona Process) and the Eastern Partnership 
(2009). See Richard G. Whitman & Stefan Wolff, Much Ado about Nothing? The European 
Neighborhood Policy in Context, in THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE: 
CONTEXT, IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 3 (Richard G. Whitman & Stefan Wolff eds., 2010). 
[27] Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European 
Community and its Member States and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, E.E.C-
Alg., Apr. 22, 2002, 2005 O.J. (L 265) 2  [hereinafter Association Agreement]. 
[28] Regulation 232/2014, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument, 2001 O.J. (L 77) 27. 
[29] See, e.g., Press Release, European Commission, New European Union Programme to 
Support Economic and Political Governance in Algeria (July 30, 2013) (outlining the “SPRING” 
programme – Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth – intended to sustain the 
“economic and political governance in Algeria”); see also Proposal for a Council Decision on 
the Conclusion of the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an 
Association Between the European Communities and their Member States, of the One Part, and 
the Republic of Algeria, of the Other Part, on a Framework Agreement Between the European 
Union and the Republic of Algeria on the General Principles for the Participation of the 
Republic of Algeria in Union Programmes, COM(2014) 384 final (June 27, 2014). 
[30] See, e.g., Fawaz Yusuf, A Structural Change Analysis of EU–Moroccan Trade 
Liberalisation and Economic Development Between 1995 and 2010, 19 J. N. AFR. STUD. 413 
(2014) (questioning, with specific regard to the Maghreb region, the EU’s ability to generate any 
real economic diversification and enhanced employment opportunities by means of free trade). 
[31] Memorandum from Eur. Comm’n, ENP Package – Algeria (Mar. 27, 2014), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-219_en.htm. 
[32] Association Agreement, supra note 27, arts. 32, 39, 44. 
[33] European External Action Service, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
in 2013, Regional Report: A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the 
Southern Mediterranean Partners, at 3 SWD (2014) 100 final (Mar. 27, 2014) (reporting delays 
in bilateral cooperation). 
[34] See Nick Whitney and Anthony Dworkin, A Power Audit of EU-North Africa Relations, 
EUR. COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, at 45 (2012), http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR62_NAPA_REPORT.pdf. 
[35] See Federica Bicchi, The Impact of the ENP on EU-North Africa Relations: The Good, the 
Bad and the Ugly, in THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE: CONTEXT, 
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACTSUPRA NOTE 26, AT 206, 218; HAKIM DARBOUCHE, ENERGISING 
EU-ALGERIAN RELATIONS, 1 MAGHREB CENTER J. 1 (2010). FOR A GENERAL CRITIQUE OF THE ENP, 
SEE NATHALIE TOCCI, THE NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY IS DEAD. WHAT’S NEXT FOR EUROPEAN 
FOREIGN POLICY ALONG ITS ARC OF INSTABILITY?, ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI [IAI]  (NOV. 
16, 2014), AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW.IAI.IT/SITES/DEFAULT/FILES/IAIWP1416.PDF. 
[36] See Proposal for a Council Decision, supra note 29. 
[37] Erwan Lannon, Entry into Force of the New European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Negotiation of “Deep and Comprehensive” Free Trade Areas: A European Neighbourhood 
Policy Running at Different Speeds, IEMED. MEDITERRANEAN Y.B. (2014), at 228. 
[38] See generally Vicky Reynaert, Explaining EU Aid Allocation in the Mediterranean: A 
Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, 16 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 405 (2011). 
[39] Whitman & Wolff, supra note 26, at 14. 
[40] Abu-Odeh, supra note 15. 
[41]Press Release, European Commission, President Barroso Visits Algeria and Signs a 
Memorandum on Energy (July 7, 2013). 
[42] The “Desertec Industrial Initiative” project, which held much promise in 2005, envisaged 
large exports to Europe of solar energy gathered in Algerian deserted areas, with heavy European 
investment in solar technology. Desertec Abandons Sahara Solar Power Export Dream, 
EURACTIV, May 31, 2013, http://www.euractiv.com/energy/desertec-abandons-sahara-solar-p-
news-528151. 
[43] Eur. Comm’n, Directorate General for Trade, Countries and Regions: Algeria (Sept. 4, 
2014), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/algeria/. 
[44] Theoretical underpinnings for the EU’s liberal trade aspirations were articulated by, among 
others, Béla A. Balassa, The Importance of Trade for Developing Countries, in NEW DIRECTIONS 
IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 3 (Béla A. Balassa ed., 1989). 
[45] ALBERT CAMUS, ALGERIAN CHRONICLES (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Belknap Press 2013) 
(1958). Camus’s federalist vision for Algeria has been harshly criticized as offensive and 
politically insensitive to the quest for independence of the Algerian people. See, e.g., AÏCHA 
KASSOUL & MOHAMED LAKHDAR MAOUGAL, THE ALGERIAN DESTINY OF ALBERT CAMUS 161 
(2006) (defining Camus’s federalism as “manipulative and mad”). 
[46] Most notably with Altiero Spinelli, author of the Ventotene Manifesto and himself a 
committed Europeanist. See Bertrand Vayssière, Les origines italiennes du fédéralisme européen 
pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, 8 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 37 (2002). 
[47] In 1944 Camus co-authored the Lyon Déclaration du Comité français pour la fédération 
européenne (CFFE), which read in part : “Il est impossible de reconstruire une Europe prospère, 
démocratique et pacifique, sous la forme d’un assemblage d’États souverains, séparés par leurs 
frontières politiques et douanières. . . .” 1 CAHIER DE LA FÉDÉRATION EUROPÉENNE (CFFE) 25, 
25-27 (1945) (emphasis added). See also GRÉGOIRE ELDIN, L’EUROPE DE ROBERT SCHUMAN 11 
(2001). In March 1945, Camus participated (along with Spinelli) in the first conference of the 
European Federalist Movement in Paris. See ERNESTO ROSSI, ALTIERO SPINELLI & PIERO S. 
GRAGLIA, “EMPIRICO” E “PANTAGRUEL”: PER UN EUROPA DIVERSA: CARTEGGIO 1943-1945 72 
(Piero S. Graglia ed., 2012). 
[48] KASSOUL & LAKHDAR MAOUGAL, supra note 45, at 161. 
[49] See CAMUS, supra note 45, at 73. 
[50] Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 227(2), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11. “With regard to Algeria and the French overseas departments, the general and 
particular provisions of this Treaty relating to: 
– the free movement of goods; 
– agriculture, [save for] Article 40(4); 
[…] 
– the institutions, 
shall apply as from the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.” 
[51] Nicolaïdis, supra note 9. 
[52] One such person was Mr. Belbouab, whose German pension was endangered by his de jure 
loss of French nationality. Case 10/78, Belbouab v. Bundesknappschaft 1978 E.C.R. 1915. 
[53] Camus, born in Algeria to a French wine-cellar worker, must have been aware of the fact 
that Algeria’s economy was heavily dependent on wine exports, and there was nothing more 
iconic to the project of European integration than trade in wine and liquor. The fortunes of 
Algeria’s wine industry would have certainly been within the range of his inquiry. OLIVIER 
TODD, ALBERT CAMUS: A LIFE 3 (1997). 
[54] Meloni & Swinnen, supra note 10. 
[55] Id. 
[56] Davis, supra note 8. 
[57] Issam Nedjah, Les Relations Euro-Algériennes de la Coopération au Partenariat, 10 
DOMITIA 149, 150 (2008). 
[58] See id. at 151. 
[59] Davis, supra note 8. 
[60] Council Regulation 816/70, art. 26, 1970 O.J. (L 99) 1. See JEFFREY A. MUNSIE, A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WINE PRODUCTION (2002), available at 
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8944668/Munsie.pdf?sequence=1. 
[61] See European Inst. for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation [MEDEA], 
EU-Algeria Relations, http://www.medea.be/en/countries/algeria/eu-algeria-relations/ (last 
visited on Feb. 9, 2015). 
[62] It appears that Algerian food exports, including cereal, had doubled between 1976 and 1986, 
but then contracted again. See id. 
[63] Algeria Resumes its WTO Membership Negotiations, WORLD TRADE ORG. [WTO] (Apr. 5, 
2013), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/acc_dza_05apr13_e.htm. 
[64] Supra note 43. 
[65] Association Agreement, supra note 27. 
[66] Id. at art. 9 (“Products originating in Algeria shall be imported into the Community free of 
customs duties and charges having equivalent effect.”) 
[67] Algeria does not meet the vulnerability criteria that let other countries receive more 
favorable treatment (GSP+).  Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishes eligibility criteria for special incentive arrangement for sustainable 
development and good governance (GSP+). See Council Regulation 978/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 303) 
1. 
[68] Eur. Comm’n, Directorate General for Trade, Algeria: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with 
the World (July 5, 2013) [hereinafter DG Trade: Algeria], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/amp/doc/trade_mp_en.pdf. 
[69] See Mohamed Y. Haddoud, Keith Salmon, Paul Jones & Robert Newbery, The Impact of 
Regional Trade Agreements on North African Countries’ Foreign Trade and Economic Welfare, 
Evidence from Algeria and the European Union Association Agreement, REGIONAL STUDIES, 
www.regionalstudies.org/uploads/HADDOUD_RSA_FINAL_COPY.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 
2015) (“[T]rade creation occurred mainly in imports rather than exports. . . . [A]lthough the 
regional membership may create trade for North African countries, it may not be sufficient to 
overcome export issues[.]”) 
[70] The value of imports of mineral products went from 20,080 million Euros in 2008 to 31,968 
million Euros in 2012. DG Trade: Algeria, supra note 68. 
[71] Algeria, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Algeria.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2014) 
[hereinafter Encyclopedia]. 
[72] The value of Algerian textiles exported to the EU, expressed in millions of Euros, was one 
in 2008-2009 and has been zero since 2012. DG Trade: Algeria, supra note 68. 
[73] ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 71. 
[74] Id. 
[75] Ulrika Lomas, Algeria Delays Implementation of FTA with EU, TAXNEWS, Sept. 4, 2012, 
http://www.bilaterals.org/?algeria-delays-implementation-of#sthash.0zUcmgKh.dpuf (reporting 
that, according to Algerian trade minister Mustapha Benbada, “the existing association 
agreement with the EU cost Algeria USD2.5m in lost customs duties between 2005 and 2009, 
while investments from the EU have not been as strong as initially anticipated. At the same time, 
Algerian imports from the EU have increased dramatically”) 
[76] See id. 
[77] See, e.g., RESILIENT LIBERALISM IN EUROPE’S POLITICAL ECONOMY (Vivien A. Schmidt & 
Mark Thatcher eds., 2013). 
 
